International Models in Emergency Management – Norway

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Facts and figures

- **Area**: 385,155 square kilometres
- **Coastline**: Norway's coastline stretches over 25,148 kilometres
- **Population**: 5,312,343 inhabitants (August 2018)
- **Oil and gas production** account for 20 percent of the economy
- **Other important sectors** include hydropower, fish, forests, and minerals
- **State revenues** from petroleum are deposited in the world's largest sovereign wealth fund
«Civil Preparedness is the first line of Defence»
Public Security (Civil Protection)

- more than The Police and The Armed Forces

- Its about protecting life, health, democracy, ability to govern and vital societal functions
- Its about robust societies with the ability to meet what ever comes along
What's out there?
High Consequence - Low Probability Scenarios

- Extreme events
- Serious, but imaginable, scenarios (NRA)
- Everyday events

Consequence vs. Probability
Main challenges

- Climate change
- Terrorism
- Health
- Technology
- Global security and territorial integrity
- Increased migration
- Hybrid warfare
We should not always blame it on the weather

Bus stop : The River
17. September 2015
Understanding the nature of vulnerability is increasingly a question of understanding the complexity in value chains.
Framework for Civil Protection in Norway

What is important to safeguard?

What should we safeguard against?
Reasonable worst-case scenarios
Critical functions – what must be protected

1. Governance and Crisis Management
2. Defence
3. Law and Order
4. Health and Care
5. Search and Rescue
6. ICT – security
7. Nature and the Environment
8. Food and Fuel Supply
9. Fresh Water and Sewers
10. Financial Services
11. Power Supply
12. Electronic Communication
13. Transport
14. Satellite Services
All Hazards Approach

- Society is facing different kinds of hazards:
  - Natural hazards
  - Severe accidents
  - Malicious Acts
- The aim is to strengthen societal resilience in general
- What is the direct cause (hazard) might be of lesser importance
Responsibility

- Much of the infrastructure is privately owned
- It is the owners` responsibility to secure continuity in critical services and deliveries
- The authorities` role is to regulate and follow up, using all available tools: audits, private/public partnership, incentives, information and others
- How to balance carrot and stick?
No Quick-Fix

- Governments can only use ordinary government tools to instigate change
- The first step is to focus, prioritize and clarify expectations
Public Private Partnership

• Establish appropriate formats for cooperating with the corporate world, including at the highest levels of government
• Identify better ways of communicating and sharing relevant information - including classified information
• Involvement in exercises
Reasonable worst-case scenarios
Then came 22. July 2011

- 77 killed
- 42 Serious wounded
The Report from the 22nd of July Commission
Failures mainly due to

1. The ability to **acknowledge risk** and learn from exercises has not been sufficient.

2. The ability to **implement decisions** that have been made, and to use the plans that have been developed, has been ineffectual.

3. The ability to **coordinate and interact** has been deficient.

4. The potential inherent in **information and communications technology** has not been exploited well enough.

5. Leadership's willingness and ability to clarify responsibility, set goals and adopt measures to **achieve results** have been insufficient.
The Norwegian Total Defence Concept

- Mutual support and cooperation between the Norwegian Armed Forces and Civil Society
- In prevention, contingency planning, crisis management and consequence management
- From peace through crisis to war
Total Defence Concept

- Developed in Norway after 2WW
- Basically meant:
  - Society’s total resources could be mobilized to defend the country
  - Utilize society’s limited resources best possible way
Cooperation throughout the Crisis Spectrum

A whole of Society Approach

- International resources
- Military resources
- Commercial resources
- NGOs
- Public civilian resources
- Individual preparedness

Cooperation throughout the Crisis Spectrum
Recognizing that Societal Resilience is a cornerstone in Deterrence
The Armed Forces

• The Armed Forces will require additional support from the civilian society within a number of areas exceeding their normal needs.

• Such areas as:
  – Transportation
  – Health
  – Specialized serviced (Telecom/ICT)
  – Oil/fuel
  – Food
  – Electricity
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A clear interdependency between a functioning Civil Society and the overall capability of the Armed Forces.
NATO’s reliance on Civilian Support

• 90 % of all military transportation is performed by civilian contractors or with civilian resources
• More than 50 % of satellite traffic for military purposes is delivered by civilian (commercial) actors
• More than 75 % of Host Nation Support to NATO operations is provided by civilian actors or by means of civilian infrastructure
NATO Crisis Response System vs. Norwegian CRS

The two national CRS manuals as one document
The seven baseline requirements

1. Assured continuity of government and critical government services
2. Resilient energy supplies
3. Ability to deal effectively with the uncontrolled movement of people
4. Resilient food and water resources
5. Ability to deal with mass casualties
6. Resilient communications systems
7. Resilient transportation systems
Host Nation Support
Current Workflows

• Risk and vulnerability assessments for the 14 vital functions with status reports to Parliament
• Capability assessments on NATO`s Seven Baseline Requirements
• Measures to reduce vulnerability and improve capability
Mitigate or fix?

Ratio 1 : 7
Personal emergency preparedness
You are part of Norway's Emergency preparedness
Et trygt og robust samfunn - der alle tar ansvar

WAR

PEACE

KRIGSLYS

FREDSLYS
• A blur between State Security and Societal Safety (Public Security)
• Non-kinetic warfare
Trust – a high value commodity
Then came Covid-19

- Total cases 177K
- Deaths  827
- Vaccine 65%
The National Total Defence Forum
Pitfalls

• Failure of imagination
• Failure of initiative
• Failure of coordination
• Failure of communication
• Failure of learning
Questions?

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